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We extend existing estimators for duration data that suffer from non-random sample selection
to allow for time-varying covariates. Rather than a continuous-time duration model, we propose a
discrete-time alternative that models the effects of sample selection at the time of selection across
all subsequent years of the resulting spell. Properties of the estimator are compared to those of a
naive discrete duration model through Monte Carlo analysis and indicate that our estimator outper-
forms the naive model when selection is non-trivial. We then apply this estimator to the question
of the duration of monetary regimes and ﬁnd evidence that ignoring selection into pegs leads to
faulty inferences.1 Introduction
The consequences of non-random sample selection have been known among political scientists for
quite some time. A growing body of literature exists that documents the consequences of ignor-
ing sample selection and that demonstrates its effects on our understanding of real-world political
phenomena, including voter turnout, interest group lobbying, public opinion, and the outcome
of international crises. As the methodological tools and interests of political scientists have de-
veloped, we have extended our studies into situations where existing techniques for correcting
selection bias do not ﬁt the question in hand. Speciﬁcally, the last decade has seen a dramatic
rise in the use of duration models to explain the time until political events occur, including regime
transitions, the conﬁrmation of political nominees, position-taking by elected representatives and
the duration of cabinets in parliamentary democracies. Unfortunately, until recently there has been
no way to deal with issues of sample selection in these and other duration analyses, despite many
theoretical advances that indicate that selection should be a concern.
In response to this gap, researchers have proposed a couple of approaches for dealing with sam-
ple selection issues in the duration context. Prieger (2002) uses copulae (see, e.g., Smith 2003) to
bind together two marginal distributions while Boehmke, Morey and Shannon (2006) use bivariate
distributions to accomplish the same task. The latter demonstrates through Monte Carlo analy-
sis that ignoring sample selection issues can result in biased parameter estimates when estimating
naive duration models — including the exponential, Weibull, and Cox — on data that suffer from
selectivity.
While political scientists are already applying these estimators (e.g., Beardsley and Asal 2009;
Long, Nordstrom and Baek 2007), one signiﬁcant shortcoming is that they do not allow for time-
varying covariates, despite the fact that many, perhaps most, applications of duration models in-
volve explanatory factors that change over the course of a single spell. Unfortunately, extending
existing models to permit time varying covariates are complicated by the move from a single
stochastic component for the entire duration to a series of them — one for each interval of a spell
(e.g., each year or day). Even without the sample selection component, any (parametric) duration
model that allows for time-varying covariates (hereafter, TVCs) models the probability of failure
within each interval of a spell, rather than the continuous hazard at each point in time.
1Given this difference between estimators for time-invariant covariates and those for TVCs,
developing an estimator that accounts for sample selection in durations with TVCs requires a
different approach than that used for continuous-time durations without TVCs. In this paper we
develop such an estimator. Our approach reﬂects the discrete nature of failure within an interval
by joining probit models for selection and duration. While moving to a discrete duration model
means that we do not model duration dependence directly through the parametric shape of the
error distribution (e.g., Weibull, log-normal), duration dependence is still easily modeled through
the inclusion of appropriate variables measuring time since a spell begins. We allow the error in the
selection equation from the year the spell begins to be correlated with the errors in each interval
for the subsequent spell; we also assume that despite this correlation, errors within a spell are
uncorrelated witheachother. Inordertopermitgreaterﬂexibility, weallowthecorrelation todecay
over time so that the effect of selection may decrease over the course of a spell as an observation
moves farther away from the circumstances at the time of selection. This assumption both extends
the applicability of our estimator and also likely ﬁts with empirical reality: the conditions that help
engender selection will generally have a large effect early on in the ensuing duration process, but
their effect will often decrease over time as circumstances change and new forces swamp the initial
conditions.
In order to evaluate the usefulness of our proposed estimator, we perform a series of Monte
Carlo simulations comparing its results to those obtained from naive discrete-time duration esti-
mators. We vary both the initial correlation as well as its rate of decay. Our results provide strong
support for our new estimator, which outperforms the naive estimator in terms of bias and root
mean squared error whenever the correlation is non-trivial.
We then apply our estimator to the study of the duration of monetary regimes. A recent view
holds that the decline in the average duration of pegged exchange rates in the early 1990s was
likely caused by the increasing global integration of capital markets (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
We argue that the kind of countries that adopt pegs differ from the general population of countries.
In fact, our correction for sample selection ﬁnds evidence consistent with the idea that unobserved
factors that lead a country to choose a peg also make that country more likely to drop out of
that peg. Such evidence is consistent with the idea that countries use only short-term criteria
2to judge the beneﬁts and costs of pegs or systematically underestimate their ability to maintain
a peg. Further, correcting for non-random sample selection also changes our inferences about
key explanatory factors. In particular, we ﬁnd a greater role for political factors such as political
stability, and a reduced role for economic factors such as reserve accumulation. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the idea that reserves may merely be a signal of the resolve of a country to defend
a peg rather than being the means to the end of defense of the peg.
2 Existing Estimators for Duration Data with Selection
Non-random sample selection is a problem for standard estimators because unobserved factors that
inﬂuence the duration (or, more generally, the quantity) of interest also inﬂuence whether or not
that observation makes it into the sample at all. When this relationship exists, the value of the
dependent variable of interest is related to the selection process, since it depends on both the sys-
tematic and the unobserved stochastic components. Observed values of the dependent variables are
therefore not representative, even for the observed sample. Because the dependent variable is un-
representative, parameter estimates are biased, even after controlling for individual characteristics
through independent variables. The severity of the problem depends on the correlation between
explanatory factors in the selection and outcome equations. When they are correlated, this gen-
erally induces correlation between the error term in the equation of interest and the independent
variables. Thus an additional assumption is violated and the bias is generally exacerbated. In more
complicated models, bias in one parameter can lead to bias in other parameters.
A common solution for selection bias involves modeling the selection process and estimating
its parameters while simultaneously estimating the parameters of the equation of interest (e.g.,
Heckman 1976 and 1979; Dubin and Rivers 1990). In these cases, one conditions on the selection
process when estimating the quantity of interest. With a properly speciﬁed selection equation,
these estimators generally produce consistent parameter estimates.
Boehmke, Morey and Shannon (2006) build on these results by developing an estimator for
duration data with possible non-random sample selection. They use a bivariate exponential distri-
bution to link the discrete outcome of the selection equation with the continuous duration outcome
of interest. This estimator is then extended to allow for Weibull duration dependence. The deriva-
3tion parallels that used to correct for selection bias with a continuous (Heckman 1976, 1979) or a
discrete (Maddala 1983; Dubin and Rivers 1990) dependent variable. By jointly modeling the se-
lection and duration processes, consistent estimates are obtained. An alternate approach is taken by
Prieger (2002), which uses copulae to combine a probit selection equation with a Weibull duration
equation.
In these estimators, the duration component corresponds to a continuous-time duration model
with time-invariant covariates.1 Yet many applications of duration models involve TVCs. For
example, the duration of cabinets may depend on economic performance, which changes from
month-to-month or year-to-year; the duration of militarized interstate disputes may depend on
the losses taken by each side or by the actions of third parties that try to intervene. Standard
continuous-time duration models can be easily modiﬁed to allow for TVCs by partitioning each
spell into intervals during which included covariates do not change. These intervals may be days,
months, or years depending on the frequency with which observed values change. The likelihood
of each spell is then calculated with the product of the probability of surviving each interval given
survival until that interval, until the last period, which contributes either a discrete probability
of failure if failure is observed or a discrete probability of survival if the observations is right-
censored.2
In essence, then, estimating a continuous-time duration model with TVCs is quite the same
as estimating a discrete-time duration model. The two main differences arise from the distribu-
tional assumptions regarding the error terms — parametric continuous time models often assume
a Weibull distribution whereas discrete ones assume a logistic or normal distribution — and the
treatment of duration dependence, which is accomplished implicitly through the distribution in
continuous models and explicitly through the possible inclusion of covariates relating to time in
the discrete-time models.
The move to TVCs therefore changes the structure of the estimation in such a way as to make it
difﬁcult to apply existing solutions for sample selection with duration data. Partitioning each spell
into different components and then calculating the probability of failure in each interval changes
1See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for more information on duration models in general.
2If the precise moment of failure is observed, then the last interval contributes the density of the time of failure
given survival until that interval.
4the data generating process from one in which each spell has a single stochastic component to
one in which each interval of each spell has its own stochastic term. This makes it impossible to
directly apply existing solutions for non-random sample selection in duration models. Further, it
makes it difﬁcult to extend existing solutions since one must correlate the unobserved terms at the
time of selection with potentially more than one unobserved term for each interval in the duration
of the subsequent spell. This leads us to propose an alternate, though related, form of the estimator
that allows for both sample selection and time-varying covariates.
3 Modeling Sample Selection in Discrete-Time Durations
Giventhecomplicationsjustoutlinedandthediscretenatureofthedurationprocess, wemovefrom
previous estimators’ use of continuous-time duration models to discrete-time duration models. As
with previous estimators, we continue to model the selection process as a discrete outcome, but
also model the duration process as a discrete outcome. Once an observation has selected into the
duration process, then, we assume that we observe a discrete indicator for failure for each interval
of the corresponding spell. This estimator therefore has a lot in common with discrete versions of
the Heckman model (Dubin and Rivers 1990; Maddala 1983), but rather than observing a single
outcome (e.g., whether an individual registers to vote and whether registered individuals turn out
on election day), we observe a series of zeros for each interval the individual survives followed by
a single one corresponding to failure in the last interval of the spell.
In the standard extension of the Heckman model for dichotomous outcomes, the two stochastic
components are allowed to have non-zero correlation in order to capture possible non-random
sample selection. This involves a straightforward application of, for example, the bivariate normal
distribution. If all of our durations were observed for only one interval, we too could apply this
estimator (though we would not have TVCs if that were the case). But because our duration is
measured as a vector of zeros followed by a one (or a terminal zero in the case of right-censoring),
there are a series of stochastic terms — one for each period of the ongoing spell — that could
possibly be correlated with unobserved components at the time of selection. This necessitates
modifying the standard dichotomous selection estimator to account for the duration structure.
In the following section we propose such an estimator by allowing the stochastic term in the
5selection equation at the time of entry to be correlated with the stochastic terms for each interval
of the resulting duration. Basically, this means that the effects of unobserved variables inﬂuencing
selection persist over the entire duration of the ensuing spell, but that errors across periods in a spell
are not correlated. This leads to an estimator that involves a combination of a sample selection
model for a discrete outcome to account for the ﬁrst period of a spell with the same model for
stochastic truncation in subsequent periods.
4 Derivation of the Likelihood Function
In order to derive the full likelihood, we ﬁrst describe the selection and duration equations sepa-
rately and then discuss how we link the two to account for possible non-random sample selection.
Both equations are represented with standard binary outcome models.
For the selection equation, let Ci indicate whether an individual, i, selects into the duration
sample and let the probability that Ci = 1 depend on some vector of covariates Wi. Assume a
standard threshold model as follows:
C
∗






Ultimately, we will use the bivariate normal to link the unobserved components, which makes the
selection equation a standard probit model. This set up is identical to that used in most selection
estimators.
The duration equation is modeled in a similar way, but since we must model duration in each
interval of a given spell, we add a subscript for time, t. The length of time represented by each
increment of t is determined by the largest unit of time such that covariates are constant within that
interval. In most political science applications, t will represent days, months or years. Failure is
measured by the binary variable Yit, which indicates whether individual i’s duration ends at time t.
Let Ti correspond to the ﬁnal interval of i’s spell. Thus YiTi equals one and all other realizations of
Yit are zero.3 We assume that the duration depends on a vector of covariates, Xit, at least some of
3Right-censoring is handled trivially by this model. Rather than ending with a one, right-censored observations
merely end with a zero in the last interval when censoring occurs.
6which vary over intervals of time. Duration is therefore modeled using a discrete outcome model,
whichiscommon fordiscreteeventhistoryanalyses(see, e.g., Box-SteffensmeierandJones2004):
Y
∗
it = Xit￿ + ￿it; (3)
Yit =
￿
1 if Y ∗
it > 0,
0 otherwise. (4)
Sample selection occurs when the duration data are not observed for observations with Ci = 0.
This means that all values of Yit for an entire spell go unobserved.
To put these two pieces together into a single estimator, we partition the data into three groups.
The ﬁrst group involves all cases that do not select in, the second group represents the ﬁrst interval
of a duration spell for cases that select in, and the third group represents all additional intervals of
the spell for observations that have selected in and survived the ﬁrst interval. We partition the data
in this way to facilitate construction of the likelihood. At the moment of selection, observations
contribute two pieces of information: that they select in and whether they survive the ﬁrst interval.
Observations that survive the ﬁrst interval are already known to have selected in and this informa-
tion has already been incorporated into the likelihood, so they only contribute information about
whether they survive additional intervals given that they have already selected in.
Put into probability statements, then, the three pieces are: Pr(Ci = 0∣Wi), Pr(Ci = 1,Yi1 =
yi1∣Wi,Xi), and Pr(Yit = yit∣Wi,Xi,Ci = 1,1 < t). The likelihood of the data can be written out




Pr(Ci = 0∣Wi) ×
Y
Ci=1




Pr(Yit = yit∣Wi,Xit,Ci = 1). (6)
Taken separately, the ﬁrst two terms constitute a selection estimator for discrete outcomes that
includes data for observations that select in as well as those that do not. The third term represents
a selection estimator for stochastic truncation, which includes only information about individuals
that select in. Our likelihood is therefore a combination of two commonly used estimators that
individually represent the different types of information that an observation contributes.
Once assumptions are made about the distribution of the error terms and the functional form of
theestimator, thesedensitiesandprobabilitiescanbeexplicitlycalculatedandalikelihoodfunction
7can be speciﬁed. Here, we assume that the stochastic terms are generated according to a bivariate
normal distribution with correlation ￿t = Corr(￿i,￿it). This is a key assumption. First, as the sub-
script indicates, we allow the correlation to change over time. Second, we assume that the duration
errors from different intervals of a spell are not correlated with each other. This second assumption
means that selection bias is captured entirely through correlation of the error terms in each interval
of time with the selection equation error term at the time of selection; no additional information is
gained during the course of a duration. We make this restrictive assumption because to allow for
correlation across the stochastic terms for each interval in a given spell would essentially involve a
much more complicated time-series cross-sectional model with autocorrelation, which has proved
difﬁcult to estimate without restrictive assumptions.4
The ﬁrst assumption of non-constant correlation is made for both substantive and statistical
reasons. Constant correlation over time results in a limit on the maximal absolute correlation in
order to maintain semi-positive deﬁniteness of the covariance matrix for the selection equation
error and the sequence of duration equations stochastic terms.5 While all covariance matrices must
meet this condition, the structure of the one used for this estimator means that satisfying it depends
solely on the value of the correlation parameter. For example, this just means that when T = 1,
giving a 2 × 2 covariance matrix, that the correlation can not be greater than one. With longer
spells, however, the maximal correlation decreases and becomes quite low.
To allow more ﬂexibility, then, we assume that the correlation decays exponentially over time.
Substantively, this implies that unobserved factors in the selection process become less and less
important over the course of spell. We do allow some ﬂexibility in the decay process, however, by
parameterizing it as follows: ￿t = ￿0 exp(−￿(t − 1)), where ￿0 describes the correlation between
the errors from the selection equation and the ﬁrst interval of the spell and ￿ ≥ 0 allows the rate
of decay to vary. Figure 1 presents examples of the resulting correlation over time for different
values of ￿0 and ￿. Note that when ￿ is large, the correlation goes to zero after only ﬁve periods,
but when it is small, the correlation is still nontrivial after 15 periods. Of course, there is a tradeoff
between the two parameters: large initial correlations will have to decay faster whereas small ones
4see Pang (2008) for a recent discussion and a promising Bayesian approach.
5When the correlation is constant over T periods the determinant of the covariance matrix is 1 − T￿2, leading to
an upper bound on the correlation of ∣￿∣ ≤
p
1/T.
8can persist for long periods of time.
[Figure 1 about here.]
While this parameterization extends the maximal spell length, it does so by assuming that the
correlation decreases over time. We believe that this assumption has some intuitive appeal: while
unobserved components that inﬂuence selection may a have a strong relationship with unobserved
components early on in a spell, it seems reasonable to assume that that relationship will weaken
over time as the conditions present at selection recede into the past and contemporaneous unob-
served events take precedence. Even with the assumption, the maximal initial correlation still
depends on the length of the observed spells, but now it also depends on the rate of decay. Speciﬁ-






Figure 2 displays this relationship for four different values of the decay parameter and different
maximal spell lengths.
[Figure 2 about here.]
With the bivariate normal assumption, we can write out the corresponding likelihood by calcu-
lating each of the component probabilities, where Φ(z) represents the cumulative standard normal
density and Φ(z1,z2,￿t) represents the cumulative bivariate standard normal density with correla-
tion ￿t at time t.
Pr(Ci = 0∣Wi) = Pr(Wi￿ + ￿i ≤ 0∣Wi), (8)
= Φ(−Wi￿); (9)
Pr(Ci = 1,Yi1 = 1∣Wi,Xi1) = Pr(Wi￿ + ￿i > 0,Xi1￿ + ￿i1 > 0∣Wi,Xi1), (10)
= Pr(￿i > −Wi￿,￿i1 > −Xi1￿∣Wi,Xi1), (11)
= Pr(￿i ≤ Wi￿,￿i1 ≤ Xi1￿∣Wi,Xi1), (12)
= Φ(Wi￿,Xi1￿,￿0); (13)
Pr(Ci = 1,Yi1 = 0∣Wi,Xi1) = Φ(Wi￿,−Xi1￿,−￿0); (14)
Pr(Yit = 1∣Wi,Xit,Ci = 1) =

































Note that the value of Wi that obtains when selection occurs is held constant throughout the entire
ensuing spell. Even if one has data on how W changes over time, the likelihood requires that one
only use the value from the moment of selection since it provides the necessary information about
the probability of selection.
5 Monte Carlo Analysis
In this section, we examine the performance of our estimator relative to a discrete event history
model through Monte Carlo simulation. This allows us to evaluate its performance relative to a
common alternative for a particular set of parameter values.
The data are generated such that in the ﬁrst period we observe independent variables, Xi1

















We hold the values of W ﬁxed for the duration of the spell (i.e., at the values that obtain at the time
of selection), which is right-censored after twenty periods, but the values of X change over time
to allow for time-varying covariates in the duration equation according to the following formula:
Xit = Xit−1 + 0.25 + ￿it,
for t > 1 and with ￿it ∼ N(0,0.12). Among the selected observations, the correlation between the
two independent variable tends to be a bit lower than this, closer to 0.6 or 0.5 depending on the
value of ￿0.
10Using these data, we then generate a variable, Ci, that indicates whether an individual selects
into a duration spell.
Ci =
￿
1 if −0.5 + 1 × Wi + ￿i > 0,
0 otherwise. (20)
Given these parameter values, about thirty-ﬁve percent of the individuals select into the duration
process.
Finally, we generate the discrete duration outcome, Yit, according to the following equations:
Y
∗





1 if Y ∗
it > 0 and Ci = 1,
0 if Y ∗
it ≤ 0 and Ci = 1,
. if Ci = 0 or Yit−1 ∕= 0.
(22)
Note that we assume a single failure per selection event; once observations fail in the duration
process they exit the risk set. Because the values of Xit trend larger over time, the failure rate does
not drop too much since observations with larger values tend to fail sooner. While the failure rate
depends on the correlation of the error terms, this setup leads to a failure rate around twenty-two
percent when ￿0 is zero; the rate per year either decreases or increases over time depending on the
sign of ￿0. Combined with the initial selection of 350 observations into the duration process, we
end up with about 1200 to 1800 individual-year observations in the duration equation, depending
on the speciﬁc value of the correlation.
Finally, we must parameterize the correlation structure over time in order to introduce non-
random sample selection into the duration process. Since the correlation at time t is parameterized
as ￿t = ￿0 exp(−￿(t−1)), we must specify values for both the initial correlation, ￿0 and the decay
parameter, ￿. Because the value of the decay parameter, in combination with the maximal duration
length of twenty years, bounds the maximal correlation, we run our simulations for three different
values: 0, 0.3, and 0.4. We also vary the initial correlation from -0.75 to 0.75 by increments of
0.25. Note that ￿0 = 0 corresponds to a situation with no non-random sample selection. For each
combination of the two parameters, we check whether the maximal correlation is exceeded, then
omit invalid combinations from our simulations. For example, when ￿ = 0.1, the absolute value of
the correlation can not exceed 0.3.
The Monte Carlo simulations are performed by holding the values of the independent variables
constant for the entire simulation, drawing new values of the error terms for each trial, calculating
11the values of Ci and Yit, and estimating two models: our FIML likelihood in Equation 18 and a
naive probit discrete time duration model on the observed sample of spells. In both models we
cluster the standard errors on individuals. In total, we ran 500 trials for each set of values of the
error correlation and decay parameters.6
[Figure 3 Here.]
Figure3summarizestheresultsfortheparameterofmostinterest, theslopecoefﬁcient, through
kernel density plots of the estimates for different correlation and decay parameters. The darker
kernel density plot represents the results for the FIML estimator while the lighter plot represents
the naive probit results. The decay parameter varies across columns while the correlation changes
across rows. The vertical line indicates the true parameter value of 0.5. This ﬁgure shows that the
FIML estimates suffer from little to no bias whereas the probit estimates exhibit a clear bias —
up to twenty-ﬁve percent — when there is non-zero correlation. Further, there appears to be little
difference in the variability of the two estimates.
[Table 1 Here.]
Tables 1 and 2 report the results of our simulations in more detail and for all parameter values.
Table 1 focuses on the parameters from the equation of interest whereas Table 2 focuses on the
FIML estimator’s additional parameters and the selection equation. The top two panels in Table 1
present the estimates of the slope coefﬁcient, ￿, while the bottom two panels compare those for the
intercept term. Consistent with the plots just reviewed, the results provide evidence in favor of our
FIML estimator. The naive probit model always produces estimates further from the true value,
with the over- or under-estimation of the slope coefﬁcient approaching twenty-ﬁve percent. Note
that the bias increases with the correlation for a given rate of decay. In addition, it also increases
with slower rates of decay for a given amount of correlation, since the correlation remains larger
over the course of the duration. There does seem to be a cost in the form of a slightly larger
sampling standard deviation of the estimates, which is not surprising given the greater complexity
of the estimator. But when we combine bias and variance through the root mean squared error, the
6In these simulations we did not restrict the maximal correlation given the estimated decay rate, but estimates
rarely violated this condition. For most combinations of these two parameters, over 95% of our estimates satisﬁed the
condition. With larger correlations this dropped to around 80%, but our Monte Carlo results are quite similar to those
reported if we exclude these cases. Of course, this restriction has no effect on the bias of the naive estimates to which
we compare our estimator.
12FIML model outperforms the naive model for both parameters whenever the correlation is not zero.
The results for the intercept show similar levels of bias and the FIML model is again preferred by
RMSE criterion for all non-zero levels of correlation.
[Table 2 Here.]
Table 2 presents the results for the selection equation parameters and the correlation and decay
parameters. The FIML estimator provides accurate estimates of the former for all combinations of
correlation and decay parameters. It also provides accurate estimates for the correlation parame-
ter. It does not perform as well for the decay parameter, however, with large deviations from the
true value. These deviations are relatively small compared to the standard deviations, however,
particularly for smaller true values. Given that these values correspond to very fast decay in the
correlation, it is not surprising that these estimates are less precise. In light of the accuracy of the
estimates for the other parameters, however, these ﬁndings do not appear to undermine the value
of our proposed estimator.
6 The Duration of Exchange Rate Regimes
In this section we attempt to explain the length of pegged exchange rate regimes with the selection
corrected duration estimator developed above. Although no paper we are aware of in the literature
on peg duration has investigated selection effects, selection on unobservables may be an important
problem.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argued that ‘credibility’ was the key to maintaining a peg, that
credibilitywasbecomingincreasinglyhardtoearninthefaceofglobalcapitalﬂows, andthatitwas
“hard to quantify” the political reasons some nations had more success than others in maintaining
pegs. Many countries during the 1990s abandoned pegged rates of intermediate “hardness” in
the midst of ﬁnancial turbulence and ﬁnancial crises. The political costs of defending pegs were
seemingly too high, and countries found it increasingly difﬁcult to generate the credibility needed
tomaintainapeggedexchangerate(ObstfeldandRogoff1995). Onlyalimitedgroupofeconomies
were willing to subordinate monetary autonomy to the defense of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
The prognosis was grim for the ability of countries to maintain ﬁxed exchange rate regimes as
of the mid-1990s, and many economists took the view that intermediate pegs were increasingly
13short-lived as global capital markets burgeoned. However a handful of exceptional countries had
managed to maintain pegged exchange rate regimes for longer than ﬁve years. For these countries,
Obstfeld and Rogoff noted that one political factor “though difﬁcult to quantify, is that all potential
ruling groups...share a strong consensus on the primacy of the ﬁxed-rate commitment” (Obstfeld
and Rogoff 1995, pp. 87-88).
Klein and Shambaugh (2008) recently offered a revisionist view of peg duration. They accept
that the data show that most pegs break after a short period, but they also note that a signiﬁcant
proportion of peg spells (30 percent) have in fact lasted longer than ﬁve years. Klein and Sham-
baugh estimate a hazard model for exchange rate peg spells controlling for duration dependence
and the length of the preceding ﬂoat spell but not for other economic or political fundamentals.
They ﬁnd evidence for positive duration dependence–the longer a peg lasts, the less likely it is to
break. Also, longer periods of ﬂoating, prior to a peg spell, are associated with shorter pegs and
short preceding ﬂoats are associated with longer peg spells.
Our reading of the this and other related literature on peg duration is that political factors
and unobservable, hard to quantify factors related to ‘credibility’ are at play in determining the
longevity of a peg spell. A couple of thought experiments can illustrate how selection could matter.
First, there may be a relationship between the (perceived) ability and/or willingness to sustain
an exchange rate peg and the choice of whether to opt into a ﬁxed exchange rate in the ﬁrst place. If
so, then empirical work on the duration of pegs should account for selection effects before making
inferences about the determinants of duration. Certain types of countries that have an unobservable
or hard to measure ability to sustain a peg, or those which expect to gain the most, or lose the least,
from a peg are the types of countries that might select a ﬁxed exchange rate in the ﬁrst place.
Alternatively, weaker countries might select into pegs. It is possible that short-run political
considerations rather than solid fundamentals tip countries into pegs. Exchange rate based stabi-
lizations are often viewed (or recommended) as quick and effective means of eliminating volatility.
Inthemediumtermitispossiblethatotherpoliticalgoalsandconcernstrumporiginalpolicy. Also,
policymakersmaysystematicallyunderestimateanyofthefollowing: theability ofcapitalmarkets
to terminate exchange rate pegs, the ability to deal with such an attack, or the ability to maintain
macroeconomic policy consistent with the peg commitment. Selection is operative in all of these
14cases. Pegs would be more likely to fail again for reasons that are hard to quantify.
Surprise changes to the environment are a component of the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff.
There they seem to suggest that it was increasingly difﬁcult to establish sufﬁcient credibility to
maintain a peg as of the mid-1990s in the midst of rising cross-border capital ﬂows. Perhaps the
series of spectacular currency crashes in the 1990s was a learning experience for countries since
they may not have anticipated the ease with which international capital markets could put them
to the test via speculative attacks. Fixed exchange rates were the conventional policy prescription
for most countries post-Bretton Woods, through the EMS stage of European Monetary Union and
even during the early years of the ‘Washington Consensus’ as a means for stabilization, but policy
makers were slow to realize the disruptive capacity of global capital markets until after 1997-98.
Quite obviously, the durability of an exchange rate peg depends in large part on the policy,
preferences and the political capabilities of countries to successively maintain their peg from year-
to-year. Forward looking expectations and perceptions by politicians and economic actors that
inﬂuence policy and unobservable but related factors could inﬂuence the decision to join or not in
the ﬁrst place.
Sturzenegger, Levy-Yeyati and Reggio (2007) ﬁnd that several political factors are important
in explaining why countries adopt ﬁxed exchange rates. Their evidence supports the idea that
stable and strong governments are more likely to adopt a peg since they will be able to take actions
consistent with a peg even if this implies eliminating a deﬁcit for example. Also they show that a
government with higher numbers of veto players are less likely to adopt a peg. Such divisions in
the policy making process could make adopting a peg more difﬁcult, but they could also be related
to the ability to appropriately adjust in the face of a shock if a peg were to be adopted.
In the political science literature, a signiﬁcant amount of research has focused on credibility
and political factors in explaining the demise of currency pegs. Leblang and Satyanath (2008) and
Leblang and Bernhard (2000) ﬁnd evidence that political instability and political uncertainty are
signiﬁcant determinants of currency crises. Leblang and Satyanath argue that this type of result
is consistent with a model where a speculative attack is more likely when agents have a wider
range of beliefs about government policy. Leblang and Satyanath (2008) also examine the idea
that divided governments characterized by uncertain preferences and delays in decision making
15are more likely to have high costs of responding to shocks. Uniﬁed governments in their samples
are found to be less likely to have a currency crisis since they can respond to shocks with greater
resolve.
We analyze these issues in terms of both exchange rate regime choice and duration while also
controlling for the possibility that these factors are correlated with unobservables. Such an em-
pirical strategy relates directly to the discussion above. In the context of the political theories of
currency crises discussed above, it could be the case that nations size up the expected beneﬁts
and costs of joining a peg which include the possibility of a currency crisis when making the ex-
change rate regime choice. These costs and beneﬁts would depend on the expected duration of the
spell (i.e., the likelihood of a currency crisis or changes in policy preferences in the future due to
economic of political change). And these in turn could be related to the political and economic
characteristics of a country at the time of choosing to opt into a pegged exchange rate regime.
For instance, assume politicians want to avoid the economic disruption and political fallout
that currency crises entail or disdain the idea of a major policy ﬂip-ﬂop in the proceeding years.
Then it would be expected that only politicians or governments that view themselves as capable
and willing to take the necessary actions to defend a peg would opt in. Alternatively, politicians
that have (unobservable) short time horizons or who need a rapid exchange rate based-stabilization
for short-term political gain may be more likely to opt in but also they may more easily fall out of
their pegs.
6.1 Methods and Data
The variable to be explained is the duration of a pegged exchange rate spell, and we apply our
estimator to do so. Our data include information on whether countries establish a peg and how
long that peg is maintained. Because countries can start their pegs in any year, our selection
equation is itself a duration model. This involves only a minor extension to our likelihood since a
discrete duration model can be estimated with any appropriate discrete choice model. To adapt our
estimator, one only needs to subscript the selection equation variables by time.7
7Crucially, one must use the values of the independent variables from the selection equation that obtain at the time
of selection when calculating the likelihood for the entire spell. Even if these variables change over time, it is their
values at the moment of selection that provides information about the unobserved components at the time of selection.
16We use the Klein and Shambaugh de facto classiﬁcation for peg spells to analyze the issue of
duration.8 Klein and Shambaugh’s measure classiﬁes a country as having a peg during a calendar
year if the end of month exchange rate stayed within a band of ±2% against another reference
currency in each month of a calendar year and over the course of that year. They argue that the
assignment of countries to pegs is robust to the choice of bandwidth. This data set is unlike the well
knownReinhartandRogoff(2004)defactoclassiﬁcationbecauseintheKleinandShambaughdata
parity changes mean a peg spell has ended. Reinhart and Rogoff smooth their data so that one-time
parity changes do not end a spell. In this way, the variable of analysis for Reinhart and Rogoff is
smoothed exchange rate policy rather than any particular exchange rate.
Our data cover 1973 to 2000 and include pegged exchange rate spells that begin after 1972.
During this time period, we have 334 instances of pegged exchange rate spells from 125 different
countries. These regimes last an average of 3.7 years with a median duration of one year, including
sixty-four ongoing spells in 2000.
The selection model includes openness to trade, the logarithm of GDP, whether the country has
a large inﬂation in the recent past, whether a country had restrictions on the capital account, and
the number of years since 1973.9 The economic determinants we include in the duration model
are: GDP growth, trade openness, the trade deﬁcit (data from the IFS–International Financial
Statistics), international reserves relative to imports (IFS data), and the time in years since the spell
began.10
For the political determinants of regime duration we include a measure of political stability
and a measure of divided government. The political stability variable indicates the amount of
recent turnover in the government from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2003).
This variable measures the extent of turnover in the key decision makers of a government in any
8It has become well known in the 1990s that countries’ actual exchange rate policies differ from what they report to
the IMF or announce to the public. Since what matters is not what policy makers say but what actually happens, many
authors have now turned to looking at what actually happened to the exchange rate via such de facto classiﬁcations.
9Openness (i.e., exports plus imports divided by GDP and PPP) and PPP-adjusted GDP come from the Penn World
Tables. The large inﬂation indicator is 1 if a country had a freely falling exchange rate, which would typically be
associated with high inﬂation, as deﬁned in Reinhart and Rogoff between the current year and 1950. The measure of
capital account openness is from Chinn and Ito (2006).
10Manyofthevariablesthatwewantedtoincludeweremissinginalmosthalfthecases. Thisproblemisexacerbated
here since when a variable that is included in the selection equation is missing in the year a duration begins, the entire
duration is omitted. The variables we were forced to omit include trade balance, reserves, capital controls, openness
to capital ﬂows, and political changes.
17one year. We also include a variable from the same data set that measures the extent to which
the executive controls the legislature. This divided government measure is equal to 1 if the chief
executive’s party is in control of the legislature and 0 otherwise.11 Both variables are lagged by
one year to avoid simultaneity issues.
6.2 Results
Table 3 presents the results from three different models: the ﬁrst provides estimates from our
duration with selection estimator while the latter two present separate models of the decision to
start a peg and the duration of observed pegs. Consider ﬁrst the results from the former. For the
selection equation we ﬁnd that size and past experience matter. Smaller countries are more likely to
adopt a peg although the coefﬁcient on the log of GDP barely misses weak signiﬁcance (p = .103).
Also, countries that had high inﬂation or moved from a peg to a “freely falling peg” in the past are
signiﬁcantly less likely to choose a peg. Other variables are not statistically signiﬁcant. For the
duration model the only statistically signiﬁcant variable is political instability. A large turnover
in the previous year is associated with a higher likelihood of an exit from a peg with a p-value of
.036. The fact that other variables are not statistically signiﬁcant does not mean there is not other
information available: a comparison of the probit duration model that does not control for selection
and the probit model that does reveals some interesting information.
[Table 3 Here.]
Importantly, our results indicate that accounting for possible non-random sample selection mat-
ters for understanding the duration of exchange rate pegs. These differences manifest themselves
in a number of ways. First, the estimate of the correlation between the selection model and the
duration model is positive and signiﬁcant at the .05 level.12 The parameter value indicates a cor-
relation of 0.81 between the errors for the equation modeling the decision to start a peg and the
error for ﬁrst year of the duration of a new spell. The signiﬁcant decay parameter indicates that this
correlation decreases over the course of that spell. It decreases by about half each year, dropping to
0.46 in the second year and 0.26 in the third year. Further, application of Equation 7 indicates that
11These are the variables labeled STABS and ALLHOUSE, respectively, and are the same variables used in Leblang
and Satyanath (2008).
12In order to facilitate estimation we use the inverse of Fischer’s Z transformation so that ￿0 lies between -1 and 1
and an exponential transformation so that ￿ is positive.
18this combination of parameter values corresponds to a permissible covariance matrix (the longest
observed spell is 26 years). Note that of the 164 pegs in our estimation sample, 98 end in the their
ﬁrst year and that almost 143 have ended by their third year.13 Thus the selection effect has a strong
inﬂuence on almost every peg since it is largest exactly when most pegs are ending.
The positive correlation between the error term in the duration model and the selection equation
supports the idea that countries implement pegs that, though they may be difﬁcult to maintain,
offer immediate short-term gains that offset the higher probability of failure over time. It is also
evidence against the idea that only countries that are stronger or more capable for unobservable
reasons choose to implement pegs.
Accounting for selection changes the interpretation of the effect of a number of variables on
the duration of pegged exchange rates. First, the coefﬁcient for the reserves ratio is negative and
signiﬁcant at the .10 level in the naive probit model (p = .052) but is not near signiﬁcance in the
selection model (p = 0.24). Note that the change in signiﬁcance results mainly from a reduction
in the magnitude of the coefﬁcient rather than an inﬂation in the standard error. Accounting for
non-random sample selection appears to eliminate induced correlation between reserves and un-
observed factors. Second, the opposite occurs for political instability, which becomes signiﬁcant
at the .05 level once we account for selection (the p-value goes from 0.141 to = .036). This is
compatible with the idea that political factors matter more than the economic ability to maintain a
peg with reserve backing. Without controlling for selection, it appears that the impact of economic
variables is overstated.
Third, after accounting for selection there remains no signiﬁcant duration dependence. Al-
though the naive probit indicates negative duration dependence, it appears that this result is almost
entirely driven by unobservables rather than duration dependence per se. Fourth, a direct compar-
ison of the two models also provides evidence for our estimator. A likelihood ratio test comparing
the combined likelihoods of the two independent models to the likelihood of the combined model
produces a ￿2
2 test statistic value of 24.3, which has a p value less than .001.14
[Figure 4 Here.]
13We lose the other 169 pegs in our data set due to missing data, which is particularly problematic in this context. If
a covariate explaining selection is missing at the time of entry, the entire spell is lost since we need to include its value
when calculating the likelihood contribution for each subsequent year of the associated spell.
14The formula for the test statistic is −2((−213.092 − 497.228) − (−698.165)).
19In order to better illustrate the differences in the ﬁndings, Figure 4 plots the hazard function
for exchange rate pegs from the naive and selection models over time. We hold all independent
variables ﬁxed at their median values, with the exception of time, which we increase from the
ﬁrst year of a spell up to ﬁfteen years. Because the naive probit model exhibits negative duration
dependence, the hazard steadily decreases over time. The duration model with selection, however,
exhibits two competing forces with different effects: one from the insigniﬁcant, but positive, effect
of duration dependence, the other from the decay of the positive correlation over time. In order
to better distinguish these two forces, we predicted the hazard both accounting for and ignoring
the effect of duration dependence. The lighter dashed line isolates the effect of the correlation as
it decays over time and shows how the hazard decreases in response. After about eight years, the
correlation is basically zero and the hazard remains constant over time. The black dashed line then
incorporates the estimate of duration dependence, which, while modest at ﬁrst, ultimately pushes
the hazard to start increasing after about six years. Given that most of the observed pegs in our
sample end in the ﬁrst few years, this ﬁgure shows that the naive model tends to understate the
chance that a peg will fail in the ﬁrst year by almost 0.1, but then overstates it for the next few
years by about the same amount.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we discuss the problem of extending existing estimators for duration models that al-
low for non-random selection to cases with time-varying covariates. This extension is not straight-
forward and, we believe, is best handled by moving from continuous-time duration models like
the Weibull to discrete-time duration models. Here we use the bivariate normal distribution to
construct a full-information maximum likelihood estimator, essentially combining standard mod-
els for stochastic truncation and stochastic censoring with binary dependent variables of interest.
Monte Carlo simulation shows that our estimator generally outperforms a naive discrete time dura-
tion estimator when the correlation is nontrivial. An empirical application of this estimator to the
duration of pegged exchange rate regimes shows that the presence of non-random sample selection
greatly inﬂuences our conclusions about which factors matter.
As demonstrated in our empirical application, it is straightforward to extend our estimator to
20allow for a discrete time duration process in the selection equation. An individual has the chance
to begin the duration process at different points in time, though all information about selection
occurs in the period in which they ultimately enter the duration process. Many political science
applications of this sort raise an additional issue: repeated events. For example, countries may
select into conﬂicts, see the conﬂicts end, but then select into new conﬂicts in the future. Our
estimator would allow for this and many of the covariate-based adjustments for repeated events
(see, e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002).
Repeated events suggest the possibility not only of repeated selection into events, but also
from events back to the selection process. That is, countries may select into spells of conﬂict,
but when they end them they also select back into spells of peace. Accounting for this would
greatly complicate our estimator. If the initial spell of conﬂict must condition on factors at the time
of selection, then the subsequent spell of peace would have to condition on factors at the end of
conﬂict and factors at the time of selection into that conﬂict. Even this simple case would involve
a trivariate distribution, with the dimensions continuing to grow with the number of spells. While
the believe this would be a useful extension to develop, at this point we believe it would be difﬁcult
to get estimates in most practical situations.
We also want to consider alternate approaches that treat the unobserved heterogeneity through
correlated random effects. This approach has been used to generate panel selection estimators for
continuous outcomes of interest (e.g., Kyriazidou 1997, Vella 1998). One might be able to extend
these estimators to allow for discrete outcomes of interest. One important difference involves
the timing of the selection mechanism, however: panel selection models assume that the selection
process occurs each period whereas our estimator assumes that it occurs at the beginning of a spell.
Certainly one could think of empirical applications in which it would be best to model the selection
process as re-occurring in each period of an ongoing spell, so this approach may prove valuable
on its own. Extending it to allow for a single selection decision for each spell would correspond
more closely to the structure of out estimator and, we believe, would apply to a wider variety of
empirical situations in political science.
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24Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulation Results Comparing FIML Estimator to Probit Discrete Duration Estimator, Varying the Decay
Parameter and the Error Correlation
Error Correlation
Decay -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75
Parameter FIML Duration (Slope) Naive Probit Duration (Slope)
0.1 Mean 0.518 0.502 0.510 0.575 0.502 0.457
SD 0.057 0.052 0.059 0.044 0.043 0.046
RMSE 0.060 0.052 0.060 0.087 0.043 0.063
0.3 Mean 0.517 0.507 0.498 0.506 0.518 0.628 0.562 0.500 0.453 0.408
SD 0.056 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.044 0.043 0.046 0.043 0.045
RMSE 0.059 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.136 0.076 0.046 0.063 0.102
1.0 Mean 0.510 0.505 0.496 0.503 0.507 0.507 0.509 0.611 0.580 0.541 0.503 0.464 0.416 0.374
SD 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.048 0.042 0.048 0.047 0.046 0.044 0.046 0.045 0.043
RMSE 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.052 0.049 0.043 0.121 0.093 0.062 0.044 0.059 0.095 0.133
FIML Duration (Intercept) Naive Probit Duration (Intercept)
0.1 Mean -1.016 -0.997 -0.976 -1.187 -0.999 -0.819
SD 0.118 0.093 0.120 0.048 0.044 0.046
RMSE 0.529 0.506 0.491 0.688 0.501 0.322
0.3 Mean -0.995 -0.996 -0.994 -0.998 -1.004 -1.261 -1.131 -1.000 -0.871 -0.729
SD 0.108 0.097 0.092 0.096 0.077 0.047 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044
RMSE 0.507 0.506 0.503 0.507 0.510 0.762 0.632 0.502 0.373 0.233
1.0 Mean -0.995 -0.993 -0.980 -1.004 -1.010 -1.018 -1.010 -1.208 -1.146 -1.076 -1.003 -0.923 -0.840 -0.747
SD 0.077 0.083 0.081 0.094 0.079 0.072 0.060 0.048 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.050
RMSE 0.501 0.500 0.487 0.513 0.517 0.523 0.514 0.710 0.648 0.577 0.505 0.425 0.344 0.252
Notes. Results based on 100 trials, with 1000 units and spells lasting up to 20 periods. Estimates from a handful of trials that
failed to converge are excluded. Holes represent infeasible combinations of correlation and decay parameters. See paper for
additional details.
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5Table 2: Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Selection Equation and Selection Parameters, Varying the Decay Parameter and the Error
Correlation
Error Correlation
Decay -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75
Parameter Selection Equation (Slope) Selection Equation (Intercept)
0.1 Mean 1.009 1.004 1.002 -0.502 -0.502 -0.497
SD 0.064 0.062 0.065 0.052 0.047 0.049
RMSE 0.064 0.062 0.065 0.501 0.500 0.505
0.3 Mean 1.003 1.003 1.007 1.003 1.005 -0.501 -0.504 -0.500 -0.501 -0.504
SD 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.048
RMSE 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.501 0.499 0.503 0.502 0.499
1.0 Mean 1.002 1.000 1.006 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.000 -0.504 -0.500 -0.500 -0.502 -0.503 -0.501 -0.500
SD 0.060 0.063 0.060 0.065 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.046 0.051 0.051 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.051
RMSE 0.060 0.063 0.060 0.065 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.498 0.502 0.502 0.500 0.499 0.501 0.502
Correlation Parameter Correlation Decay Parameter
0.1 Mean -0.251 0.005 0.243 -1.785 -1.249 -3.383
SD 0.155 0.166 0.194 3.368 5.761 6.656
RMSE 0.155 0.166 0.194 3.407 5.856 6.744
0.3 Mean -0.514 -0.266 -0.007 0.259 0.528 -1.025 -0.934 -1.026 -1.395 -1.494
SD 0.141 0.140 0.169 0.174 0.206 0.656 2.354 5.446 3.919 0.694
RMSE 0.142 0.141 0.169 0.174 0.208 0.679 2.369 5.449 3.924 0.754
1.0 Mean -0.762 -0.514 -0.283 0.000 0.258 0.529 0.767 0.031 0.168 0.194 -0.922 -0.263 -0.117 -0.285
SD 0.420 0.138 0.127 0.163 0.154 0.276 0.833 1.096 1.295 2.035 4.705 3.120 0.802 0.428
RMSE 0.420 0.138 0.131 0.163 0.154 0.278 0.834 1.096 1.306 2.045 4.794 3.131 0.811 0.514
Notes. Results based on 100 trials, with 1000 units and spells lasting up to 20 periods. Estimates from a handful of trials that
failed to converge are excluded. Holes represent infeasible combinations of correlation and decay parameters. See paper for
additional details.
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6Table 3: FIML Duration and Selection Estimator versus Naive Probit Estimates of Pegged Ex-
change Rate Regime Initiation and Duration, 1960-2004
FIML Duration Naive Probit
and Selection Duration Selection
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Selection
Trade Openness 0.028 0.279 0.036 0.285
GDP (log) −0.048 0.029 −0.047 0.031
Recent Hyperinﬂation −0.383∗∗ 0.115 −0.430∗∗ 0.127
Uniﬁed Government (Lagged) 0.080 0.115 0.063 0.117
Stability (Lagged) 0.106 0.153 0.129 0.153
Capital Account Openness −0.004 0.046 −0.016 0.055
Time 0.024 0.033 0.032 0.036
Time Squared −0.000 0.001 −0.001 0.001
constant −0.320 0.801 −0.351 0.828
Duration
Trade Openness −0.092 0.380 −0.268 0.500
GDP Growth 0.613 0.504 0.808 0.679
Reserves/Imports −0.386 0.331 −0.722∗ 0.372
Exports/Imports (logged) −0.045 0.172 0.012 0.256
Stability (Lagged) 0.440∗ 0.210 0.370 0.251
Uniﬁed Government (Lagged) −0.074 0.161 −0.175 0.200
Spell Time 0.035 0.034 −0.182∗∗ 0.038
constant −1.168∗∗ 0.315 0.250 0.336
Correlation




Observations 1628 353 1439
Final Log-likelihood -698.165 -213.092 -497.228
Notes. * indicates p ≤ .10 with a two-tailed test; ** indicates p ≤ .05. Standard errors clus-
tered on country. Likelihood ratio test for two independent equations versus constrained
FIML estimator: ￿2
2 = 24.3 (p = .0000053).
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28Figure 2: Maximal Absolute Correlation in the First Period of a Spell by Maximum Spell Length,
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29Figure 3: Kernel Density Plots of Slope Coefﬁcient Estimates from Monte Carlo Analysis, Varying
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